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Be angry, but sin not. Ephesians 4:26 
 
 
ABSTRACT: A long philosophical and political tradition holds that 
victims of injustice ought not get angry because doing so would be 
counterproductive. But this tradition neglects the possibility that anger 
might be counterproductive and yet apt. What ought a victim of injustice 
do when her anger would worsen her situation but nonetheless be a fitting 
response to the state of the world? Here reasons of prudence and reasons 
of aptness come apart, generating, I argue, a substantive normative 
conflict. Two things, I suggest, follow. First, the counterproductivity 
critic faces the burden of explaining why, in such conflicts, prudential 
considerations trump considerations of aptness; until this burden is met, 
there is no obvious inference to be made from the counterproductivity of 
one’s anger to an all-things-considered prohibition on one’s getting angry. 
Second, it’s plausible that such conflicts – where victims of oppression 
must choose between getting aptly angry or acting prudentially – 
themselves constitute a form of unrecognised injustice, what I call affective 
injustice. I conclude by discussing the prospects for alleviating affective 
injustice in the political sphere, and offering a diagnosis of our reluctance 
to make room, in our politics, for anger. 
 
 
1. The counterproductivity critique 
 
In 1965, the Cambridge Union held a debate between James Baldwin and William F. 
Buckley, Jr on the motion ‘The American dream has been achieved at the expense of 
the American Negro’. Baldwin’s essay The Fire Next Time had been published two 
years earlier; Buckley had been editor-in-chief of the conservative magazine National 
Review, which he founded, for the past decade. Both men were at the height of their 
fame, the most important public intellectuals, respectively, in the American civil 
rights movement and the American conservative movement.  
 
Baldwin took the floor first, and began in a quiet, recalcitrant tone: ‘I find myself not 
for the first time in the position of a kind of Jeremiah’.1 He was to deliver bad news, 
but as history rather than prophecy. Instead of revealing the future he came to 
                                                 
1 All quotations from The Riverbends Channel 2012. 
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disclose the unrecognised truth about the material preconditions of the American 
dream: 
 
I am stating very seriously, and this is not an overstatement: that I 
picked the cotton, and I carried to market, and I built the railroads, 
under someone else’s whip, for nothing . . . for nothing. The southern 
oligarchy which has until today so much power in Washington…was 
created by my labour and my sweat, and the violation of my women and 
the murder of my children. This, in the land of the free and the home of 
the brave. And no one can challenge that statement. It is a matter of 
historical record. 
 
Buckley responded not with disagreement, but with a pragmatic challenge: 
 
What in fact shall we do about it? What shall we in America try to 
do…to eliminate those psychic humiliations which I join Mr Baldwin in 
believing are the very worst aspects of this discrimination?...I agree 
with you that we have a dastardly situation, but I’m asking you not to 
make politics as the crow flies…[Negroes] have done a great deal to 
focus on the fact of white discrimination against Negroes. They have 
done a great deal to agitate a moral concern. But where in fact do they 
go now? 
 
Politics ‘as the crow flies’2 is a politics that insists on what should have been rather 
than what is, a politics that refuses to turn its gaze from past atrocity. It is also a 
politics, as Baldwin made clear, of uninterrupted anger. In its place Buckley exhorts 
a pragmatic politics, a politics that turns its gaze from the failures of the past in 
order to achieve the next-best outcome in the future. Whatever its ugly history, 
Buckley went on to argue, the American dream was now the best hope for the 
American Negro. Where better to improve his lot than in the United States, the 
‘most mobile society in the world’? What other dream to which to aspire than the 
American one? A bitter insistence on past injustice would only result in foolish self-
destruction. Negroes must avoid ‘the kind of cynicism, the kind of despair, the kind 
of iconoclasm’ represented by Baldwin. For in the end, Negro anger would be met, 
Buckley warned, with white violence: 
 
If it does finally come to a confrontation, a radical confrontation…then 
we will fight the issue, not only in the Cambridge Union, but we will 
fight it…on beaches and on hills and on mountains and on landing 
grounds. 
 
                                                 
2 A phrase Buckley borrows from Oakeshott. 
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Tolerance might be extended to Negroes, but not to their anger. Fiery prophecy 
must give way to cool pragmatism. 
 
Buckley’s insistence that black anger is wrong because counterproductive for black 
people themselves places him in a long intellectual tradition. While Aristotle and his 
followers held that moderate anger was a mark of manly virtue,3 the Stoics argued 
for the total elimination of anger on the grounds that it inevitably produces more 
evil than good. Thus Seneca described anger as 
 
the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions … The other emotions 
have in them some element of peace and calm, while this one is wholly 
violent and has its being in an onrush of resentment, raging with a most 
inhuman lust for weapons, blood, and punishment, giving no thought to 
itself if only it can hurt another, hurling itself upon the very point of 
dagger, and eager for revenge though it may drag down the avenger along 
with it4 
 
The early Christian theologian John Cassian counselled that we ‘ought never…be 
angry at all, whether for good or bad reasons’, for anger threatens to darken the 
‘main light of our heart’ with ‘shadows’.5 More recently, Glen Pettigrove has argued 
that anger is to be avoided for its tendency to contaminate our capacity for epistemic 
rationality.6 And Pettigrove and Martha Nussbaum both argue that anger should be 
avoided even in circumstances of political injustice because it alienates would-be 
allies, aggravates conflict and ultimately undermines the pursuit of just outcomes.7 
In the place of political anger, Pettigrove recommends the virtue of meekness, while 
Nussbaum suggests a spirit of civic love. 
 
This ‘counterproductivity critique’ of anger also takes concrete, politicised form, as 
in the debate between Baldwin and Buckley. Martin Luther King wrote of Malcolm 
X that in ‘articulating the despair of the Negro without offering any positive, 
creative alternative’ he has “done himself and our people a great disservice’ for 
‘[f]iery, demagogic oratory in the black ghettos can reap nothing but grief’.8 The 
American journalist Jonathan Chait defended President Obama’s reluctance to get 
publicly angry about white racism on the grounds that Obama was employing the 
‘sensible practice’ of encouraging black people to ‘concentrate on the things they can 
control’ rather than ‘lash[ing] out’.9 The recent riots in Ferguson, Missouri in 
                                                 
3 While the ancient Greeks disagreed about whether (free) men should ever get angry, there was 
nonetheless a consensus that in women (and slaves) anger was impermissible. For discussion see 
Harris 2002 and Burnyeat 2002. 
4 Seneca1928, I.1, emphasis added. 
5 Cassian 1894, 8:12. 
6 Pettigrove 2012; Nussbaum 2016. 
7 ibid 
8 King 1998, chp. 25. 
9 Chait 2014. 
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response to the Grand Jury’s failure to indict an officer for murdering an unarmed 
black teenager again prompted calls for reasonableness and calm from many liberal 
sympathisers. Writing on Israel’s Operation Protective Edge, in which Israel killed 
around 1500 civilians in the blockaded Gaza Strip, New York Times columnist 
Nicholas Kristof exhorted Palestinians to abandon the anger that ‘has accomplished 
nothing but increasing the misery of the Palestinian people’; if only Palestinians 
would adopt to model of Gandhi, he argued, the result would ‘reverberate around 
the world and Palestinians would achieve statehood and freedom’.10,11 Women have 
long been told that feminist progress would be swifter if only they would be less 
shrill about it. LGBT activists are reminded by their allies that progress takes time, 
and that stridency gets in the way. The counterproductivity of one’s anger is often 
seen as dispositive reason not to be angry, whatever the circumstances. Often such 
counsel is issued in a spirit, as it with Buckley, of at least putative sympathy for the 
victims of injustice. 
 
The counterproductivity critique has its opposing twin in a political tradition, one 
largely rooted in Black and feminist thought, that challenges the presupposition that 
anger is only a weapon for self-harm. In ‘The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to 
Racism’, Audre Lorde writes: 
 
Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful 
against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that 
anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source 
of energy serving progress and change…[A]nger expressed and 
translated into action in the service of our vision and our future is a 
liberating and strengthening act of clarification12 
 
Marilyn Frye, Uma Narayan, and Alison Jaggar all argue that anger can be 
epistemically productive, yielding knowledge of previously unrecognised injustice.13 
Lisa Tessman argues that while an oppressed person’s anger cannot be virtuous in 
the Aristotelian sense – lacking the moderation required for flourishing – it can 
nonetheless be virtuous in the more consequentialist sense of facilitating the 
flourishing of others.14,15 This counter-tradition is welcome because it reminds us 
that the counterproductivity critique often turns on questionable empirical 
assumptions. It is historically naïve to think that white America would have been 
willing to embrace King’s vision of a unified, post-racial nation, if not for the threat of 
                                                 
10 Kristof 2014. 
11 I am not committed to the claim that King, Chait or Kristof in fact endorse the counterproductivity 
critique of anger; I am simply committed to the view that this is a plausible reading of what they’re 
saying. King and Chait might be making a claim about the efficacy of anger as a political strategy. 
The question of whether anger (and violence) is effective as a political strategy is important, but is 
not my question here. 
12 Lorde 1981/1984. 
13 Frye 1983; Narayan 1988; Jaggar 1989. 
14 Tessman 2005. 
15 For further defence of anger, see also Swaine 1996 and Wenning 2009. 
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Malcolm X’s angry defiance. It is perhaps similarly naïve to think anger contains no 
salutary psychic possibilities for someone whose self-conception has been shaped by 
degradation and hatred.16 
 
That said, this debate tends to obscure something significant about anger. There is 
more to anger, normatively speaking, than its effects. Even if anger is 
counterproductive we can still ask: is it the fitting response to the way the world is? 
Is it, in other words, apt? Macalaster Bell and Agnes Callard defend anger as a 
sometimes fitting response to an unjust world.17 But on the whole, defenders of 
anger, because of their dialectical opposition to the counterproductivity critique, 
have focussed on the benefits of anger. By contrast I want to grant the 
counterproductivity critic’s empirical supposition that anger generally makes things 
worse, in order to focus on occasions where anger would be counterproductive but 
nonetheless apt.18 On such occasions, reasons of prudence and reasons of aptness 
come apart, generating  a substantive normative conflict. Two things follow. First, 
the counterproductivity critic faces the burden of explaining why, in such conflicts, 
reasons of prudence trump reasons of aptness; until this burden is met, there is no 
obvious inference to be made from the counterproductivity of one’s anger to an all-
things-considered prohibition on one’s getting angry.19 Second, I will argue that 
such conflicts – where victims of oppression must choose between getting aptly 
angry and acting prudentially – themselves constitute a form of unrecognised 
injustice, what I call affective injustice.  
 
I proceed as follows. In §2 I argue that weighing anger for aptness is a familiar mode 
of evaluation, and then offer an account of what is required for anger to be apt. In §3 
I describe the nature of the normative conflict presented by occasions for apt 
counterproductive anger: an invidious choice between making the world as it should 
be and affectively appreciating the world as it is. I go on to explain why this presents 
the counterproductivity critique with a challenge, and introduce the notion of 
affective injustice. In §4 I explain why the counterproductivity critic cannot sidestep 
my challenge by arguing that his real target is not anger (apt or not) but its 
stereotypical expressions. In §5 I conclude by discussing the prospects for 
                                                 
16 Frederick Douglass wrote of the moment when he resisted the attack of a slave-breaker: ‘It 
rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood. It 
recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again with a determination to be free. He only 
can understand the deep satisfaction which I experienced, who has himself repelled by force the 
bloody arm of slavery’ (Douglass 1997, 79; quoted in Bell 2009). 
17 Bell 2009; Callard forthcoming. 
18 Tessman’s defence of anger emphasises the ways in which anger can harm the oppressed, focussing 
on cases in which such harmful anger has a net positive benefit to others (Tessman 2005). By contrast 
I am concerned with cases in which the oppressed person’s anger neither benefits themselves nor 
others. 
19 Some might be concerned that, since our emotions aren’t under our direct voluntary control, it 
doesn’t make sense to talk about whether we ought to get angry. I don’t myself share this worry, 
since I find it natural enough to talk about what we ought to believe. But much of what I have to say 
extends to the question of whether we ought to try to eradicate our capacity to get angry, which is a 
voluntary action. 
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alleviating affective injustice by dissolving the false dichotomy between reason and 
anger. 
 
2. Anger’s aptness 
 
There is a striking difference between how anger is discussed in political contexts 
and how we talk about anger in more mundane situations. In ordinary conversation, 
we can and do talk about whether anger, independently of its effects, is the apt 
response to how things are; whether how things are provides one reason to be angry; 
whether one’s anger is a fitting response to how things are. We talk, I want to say, as 
if anger exists within the space of intrinsic reasons, as opposed to merely instrumental 
reasons. Suppose you are my friend, and I ask you what reason you have for being 
angry with me. You respond: ‘because you were late again!’ I say: ‘well, you 
shouldn’t be. I told you I was going to be late’. The subject of our conversation is 
whether your anger about my lateness really is fitting, whether my lateness 
constitutes genuine intrinsic reason for your anger. 
 
In ordinary conversation, we can and do mark a distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental reasons for getting angry. If you are someone who takes pleasure in 
getting angry20 I might say to you ‘I know it makes you feel good to get angry, but 
you really have no reason to be’. Here I contrast your instrumental reason for 
getting angry – it gives you pleasure – and your (lack of) intrinsic reason for getting 
angry. It is also striking that in ordinary, everyday situations, a shift of focus from 
intrinsic to instrumental justification for anger often comes across as a non sequitur 
(at best) and morally obtuse (at worst). If an unfaithful lover says in response to your 
anger: ‘you shouldn’t get angry because it’s just going to make me cheat more’, you 
have just been given additional reason for anger. For two wrongs have now been 
done: first, the initial betrayal of your trust, and second, the subsequent refusal to 
treat your anger at that betrayal as existing within the space of intrinsic reasons. 
 
The proponents of the counterproductivity critique run the risk of the second sort of 
wrong, the one committed by the unfaithful lover. It is a wrong that has something 
in common – in structure, if not intent – with the most straightforwardly oppressive 
ways of speaking about anger. The misogynist dismisses a woman’s anger by calling 
her shrill or strident; the racist dismisses the black person’s anger by calling him a 
thug or an animal. These are not mere insults. These are rhetorical strategies that 
shift the explanatory context for the subject’s anger from the space of reasons to the 
space of causes. The misogynist or racist explains away the woman or black person’s 
anger as a product of inferior character: she is only angry because she’s a shrill bitch; 
he’s only angry because he’s a thug. He interprets the question ‘why is this person 
angry?’ as a request for a causal explanation rather than a justificatory one. Thus he 
                                                 
20 Achilles in the Iliad says that anger is ‘sweeter than dripping streams of honey’ (Homer 1990, 
18.128). 
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obscures the possibility that the woman or black person’s anger is apt. The 
counterproductivity critique achieves a similar effect, shifting us from the space of 
intrinsic reason to the space of instrumental reason, thereby obscuring the 
possibility that the anger is apt. 
 
When is someone’s anger apt? Consider the difference between anger and another 
similarly negative emotion: disappointment. What makes anger intelligible as anger, 
and distinct from mere disappointment, is that anger presents its object as involving 
a moral violation: not just a violation of how one wishes things were, but a violation of 
how things ought to be.21 When I say that I am disappointed that you betrayed me, I 
imply that I wish you hadn’t; when I say, by contrast, that I’m angry that you 
betrayed me, I imply that you shouldn’t have. (This isn’t to say that if I’m angry that 
you betrayed me, I must believe that you ought not have betrayed me; I am 
concerned here with the normative evaluation expressed by my emotion, which 
might well come apart from my normative beliefs about the situation.)22 Since anger 
presents its object as involving a moral violation, one’s anger that p is apt only if p 
constitutes a genuine moral violation. If I am angry that you didn’t come to the 
party but your not coming to the party constitutes no moral violation, then my 
anger is hardly fitting.23 
 
What of the common claim – made for example by Nussbaum24 – that anger 
necessarily involves a desire to make the offending party suffer, and/or the belief 
that the offending party should suffer?25 Nussbaum, like many other contemporary 
philosophers, inherits this claim from the ancients; both Aristotle and the Stoics 
agreed that anger constitutively involved a desire for revenge, and ancient stories 
(most obviously the Iliad) suggest that the satisfaction of the revenge impulse did 
answer anger’s conative call.26 In turn Nussbaum uses this claim to support the 
conclusion that anger is never apt, for either it involves the false belief that revenge 
will undo the original harm, or the morally suspect desire to ‘downrank’ the 
offender. But the nature of anger – how we experience it, what it calls on us to do – 
plausibly shifts with historical and political circumstance. Myles Burnyeat argues 
that the erosion of the honour code under the influence of Christianity has made 
                                                 
21 Perhaps anger presents its object as involving a normative violation, not necessarily a moral 
violation. Many of us do get angry at non-moral normative violations, e.g. violations of epistemic 
rationality. 
22 Thus I am denying cognitivism about anger, the view that anger is, or at least partially composed 
of, a judgment. One can think that anger is an evaluative attitude without thinking that anger is a 
judgment. See e.g. Deonna and Teroni 2012. 
23 What if I mistakenly but justifiably believed that your not coming to the party was a moral 
violation? I’m inclined to say that my anger would be excused but inapt. If I learned that you in fact 
had made no promise to come to the party, I would hardly insist that my previous anger about your 
non-attendance was fitting.  
24 Nussbaum 2016. 
25 Nussbaum, unlike me, is a cognitivist about anger. See fn. 22 
26 Though for an argument that Aristotle thought that anger involved a desire not for revenge but 
rather a desire for punishment – specifically, that the wrongdoer suffer the same kind of pain he 
inflicted, in order to satisfy both retributive and reformative aims – see Christensen 2016. 
 8 
common a form of anger that involves no desire for revenge, a possibility 
unthinkable to ancient commentators.27 Indeed it seems to me that anger without 
the desire for revenge is something many of us know well.28 Suppose my friend 
betrays me, and I am angry with her. I might want revenge. But might I not want – 
have we not all wanted – the friend to recognise the pain she has caused me, the 
wrong she has done me? It might be that this sort of recognition itself involves 
suffering. If so then in a sense I want my friend to suffer. But I don’t want her to 
suffer willy-nilly; my anger hardly calls out for her to break her leg, or fall ill. 
Rather I want her to experience that suffering that comes precisely from taking part 
in my own. If this is a possible mode of anger – and I think it is not just possible but 
common – then Nussbaum and others are wrong to claim that anger necessarily 
involves the desire for revenge. For the desire for recognition is not the same as a 
desire for revenge. Thus the most powerful case that anger is never apt – that it 
involves a revenge-impulse that is itself always inapt – should, I think, be rejected. 
 
That my anger must be directed at a genuine normative violation is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for my anger to be apt. What else might be required? I don’t 
intend to offer a complete analysis of apt anger – and I don’t need to for my purposes 
– but let me offer a few brief observations. I have said that for S’s anger that p to be 
apt it must be that p involves a genuine moral violation. But it must also be the case 
that p constitutes what Grice called a ‘personal’ reason for S29 -- that is, a reason that 
can serve as her reason for being angry: a reason, plausibly, that S knows.30 If I don’t 
know that you betrayed me, but you have, then there would exist a reason for me to 
be angry, but I wouldn’t have a reason to be angry.31 In addition, S’s anger must also 
be properly motivated by that possessed reason, and proportional to that reason. 
Suppose I know that you lied to me, but that my anger is formed on some other 
basis: I simply get angry at everything you do. Or suppose I find out that you lied to 
me about liking a meal I cooked, and I am thereafter engulfed by a wild and lifelong 
fury. In neither case does my anger seem apt; for in the first, my anger is not 
properly motivated by the reason I possess, and in the latter my anger is 
disproportionate to my reason.32 
                                                 
27 Burnyeat 1996, 2002.  
28 For a different argument that anger does not necessarily involve the revenge-impulse – though 
anger sometimes explains the revenge-impulse – see Callard forthcoming. 
29 Grice 2001, ch. 3. 
30 For an argument that reason-possession requires knowledge see Hawthorne and Magidor 
forthcoming. 
31 This doesn’t mean that we are always in a position to know what our reasons for being angry are. 
Sometimes we lack the insight to know what our anger is really about; knowing p is distinct from 
knowing that one is angry that p. 
32 Tessman suggests that the anger of oppressed people is often mis-directed and invariably excessive. 
If so, then oppressed people’s anger is very rarely apt (Tessman 2005). But Tessman is working 
within a virtue theoretic framework that places high demands on what it would take for anger to be 
virtuous, citing Aristotle’s dictum that the virtuous person must get angry ‘at the right things and 
with the right people, and further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought’. As I see it, 
the demands of aptness are rather lower, akin to the demands of knowledge; just as one can know all 
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What about a further requirement that one’s anger be about something to which one 
has an appropriate personal connection? Would it be apt for me today to get angry, 
say, that women were burned as witches in early modern Europe? Some will be 
inclined to include some sort of proximity condition on anger’s aptness, and there is 
nothing in my argument that requires me to rule this out. (Indeed since my focus 
here is on whether victims of injustice ought to get angry, I am largely setting aside 
cases where ‘uninvolved’ third parties get aptly but counterproductively angry.) But 
let me just say that the thought that we can only be aptly angry about things that 
are sufficiently close to us in space and time, or to which we have some specific 
personal connection, can shade into an unsavoury moral parochialism. Indeed, even 
the claim that one has additional reason to be angry, or reason to be angrier, when it 
is a member of one’s own community that has been harmed depends for its 
plausibility on how we fill in the facts. I am intuitively drawn to the thought that 
black Americans have a special, additional reason to be angry when a young black 
person is gunned down in the street; here it seems only appropriate to cry out: 
another one of our children has died! But I am not inclined to think that middle class 
white men have a special, additional reason to be angry when another middle class 
white man suffers a harm. Here it does not seem appropriate to cry out: one of mine! 
Not all forms of solidarity are equally just, and not all forms of emotional partiality 
of equal moral standing. Bernard Williams memorably argued that the man who is 
faced with the choice of saving his drowning wife or a stranger is not only justified 
in saving his wife, but should do so with no thought more sophisticated than ‘that’s 
my wife!’ Any additional, justifying thought – ‘that’s my wife and in such situations 
it’s permissible to save one’s wife’ – would be, according to Williams, ‘one thought 
too many’.33 That might well be. But the white man who cries out in anger ‘one of 
mine!’ seems to have the wrong thought altogether. 
 
 
3. Apt counterproductive anger 
 
Whether anger is an apt or fitting response to the world does not turn on the 
consequences, good or bad, of that anger. Apt anger can be counterproductive, 
making the angry person worse off, and indeed exacerbating the very situation at 
which she is angry. This is especially true for victims of systematic injustice, whose 
apt anger can often invite further violence and oppression, for both herself and 
others. Thus victims of injustice often face a conflict between getting aptly angry at 
injustice, and bettering (or at least not worsening) their situations. Just what sort of 
conflict is this? 
 
                                                                                                                                           
sorts of things without being a perfect reasoner, one can be aptly angry without always perfectly 
targeting and proportioning one’s anger. 
33 Williams 1981, p. 18. 
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Prudence recommends against counterproductive anger, for such anger by definition 
is not in the self-interest of the oppressed person.34 But there is perhaps more 
counting against counterproductive anger than just prudence. Insofar as one has a 
moral duty to care for oneself – a duty of which many are justifiably sceptical – then 
there might be moral reasons not to get counterproductively angry. And getting 
aptly angry might lead to a failure to act on an other-directed moral duty, where 
getting angry will harm those to whom one has a duty of beneficence or care; this 
might most obviously occur in cases where one is a victim of an injustice that 
broadly affects members of one’s family or community.35  So apt counterproductive 
anger isn’t just prudentially irrational, but might also in some cases be morally 
objectionable.36 
 
What speaks in favour of apt counterproductive anger? What sort of value does an 
apt response have? I want to suggest that getting angry is a means of affectively 
registering or appreciating the injustice of the world, most analogous perhaps to our 
capacity for aesthetic appreciation. Just as appreciating the beautiful or the sublime 
has a value distinct from the value of knowing that something is beautiful or 
sublime, there is a value to appreciating the injustice of the world through one’s apt 
anger – a value that is distinct from that of simply knowing that the world is unjust. 
Imagine a person who does everything, as it were, by the ethical book – forming all 
the correct moral beliefs and acting in accordance with all her moral duties – but 
who is left entirely cold by injustice, feeling nothing in response to those moral 
wrongs of which she is perfectly aware. I don’t want to say that such a person has 
done anything wrong, but I do think it’s natural to say that there is something 
missing in her; that it would be better, ceteris paribus, if she were capable of feeling 
anger towards the injustice she knows to exist. Of course the sceptic about apt 
anger’s intrinsic value would argue that all that really matters is how one responds 
in action, not affect, to injustice; anger is at best instrumentally valuable for its role in 
getting us to act as we should. Since our hypothetical person acts impeccably 
without the aid of apt affect, she lacks nothing – and our intuition to the contrary is 
just an expression of our fetish (the sceptic might say) for emotion. A similar 
argument can be run against the intrinsic value of apt aesthetic responses: our 
capacity to appreciate the beautiful or the sublime, the sceptic might argue, is only 
                                                 
34 I’m not assuming that anger doesn’t have any positive psychic pay-off – that there is no pleasure, 
for example, to be taken in anger (cf. n. 20.) Rather, I’m supposing that whatever its positive pay-off, 
anger leaves the agent all-things-considered worse off than she would otherwise be. 
35 Liberals might further argue that, in some cases, getting angry violates duties of civility one owes 
to one’s fellow citizens. I am not myself sympathetic to the thought that there exist such duties – or, 
rather, I am not sympathetic to the thought that getting aptly angry at injustice is incompatible with 
whatever duties of civility one has. But nothing I say precludes the sympathetic liberal from 
characterising these conflicts as, in part, conflicts between civic duties not to get angry and the 
fittingness of one’s would-be anger. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point. 
36 Thus I was somewhat quick in suggesting that Buckley’s argument against black anger was merely 
‘pragmatic’. For the sake of ease I continue to talk about anger’s counterproductivity in terms of 
merely ‘prudential’ reasons for not angry, though it should be noted that in many of the cases I am 
interested in, more than mere prudential reason speaks against getting angry. This deepens the sort 
of conflicts I am interested in. 
 11 
instrumentally valuable for its role in getting us to act as we should (i.e. protecting 
what is aesthetically valuable). But such scepticism should be rejected as just that: a 
scepticism that can be broadly expanded to include anything that we intuit of 
intrinsic value.37 The sceptic is wrong to say that all we really care about is correct 
action, and not apt affect – and he offers us no compelling reason to think that this is 
all we should care about. 
 
That said, apt anger is not merely analogous to aesthetic appreciation, not merely a 
form of appreciating the disvalue of an unjust situation or an immoral act. Anger is 
also a form of communication, a way of publicly marking and bearing witness to 
disvalue, calling for the shared negative appreciation of others.38 That we can 
sometimes stew silently in our anger does not make this any less true. Consider 
Job’s anger, nursed over seven days and seven nights of silence, only to erupt in a 
demand that a judge find him innocent of crimes against God. Of course anger does 
not always succeed in this call; sometimes our anger calls for public recognition but 
is met with dismissal or retrenchment. And sometimes it might well be that our best 
chance of doing good in the world is to rid ourselves of our anger as best we can: to 
stop appreciating and marking the world’s awfulness in order to be able to do 
something about it. Perhaps, all things considered, this is sometimes a sacrifice 
worth making. But the point is that it is a sacrifice, one that lies at the heart of the 
conflict represented by apt counterproductive anger. On one hand, victims of 
injustice must choose between making the world as it should be, and on the other 
appreciating and marking the world as it is. This conflict is not merely psychically 
painful; it is a genuine normative conflict, a conflict involving competing and 
significant goods that often feel incomparable. 
 
This first-personal conflict faced by the victim of systematic injustice has a second-
personal counterpart. As I’ve said, proponents of the counterproductivity critique, 
like Buckley, often position themselves as well-meaning allies. They are concerned, 
they say, with the interests of those treated unjustly. But there is something morally 
insensitive in their rallying cry: ‘don’t get angry, it only makes things worse!’ It 
suggests that the moral violation is not so bad, just a practical problem to be solved, 
rather than a wrongdoing to which its victim must bear witness. It suggests that the 
primary locus of responsibility for fixing the problem lies with the victim rather 
than the perpetrator. Indeed it risks obscuring the fact that this advice is good advice 
only because of unjust social arrangements in which the speaker himself is often 
complicit. In this it shares something in common with the advice delivered by men 
to women and girls about how to avoid getting raped (abstaining from alcohol, 
revealing clothing and late nights out). The problem isn’t that such advice rests on 
false empirical premises, or that there isn’t a genuine prudential reason for girls and 
                                                 
37 Including epistemic goods like truth, justification and knowledge. 
38 It might, as I suggested in the previous section, also call for other things, e.g. that the wrongdoer is 
held accountable for his actions or that the wrongdoer share in one’s suffering. But I think that anger 
by its nature calls for others to share in its negative appreciation of injustice. 
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women to avoid situations in which they might get raped. The problem with such 
advice – and the reason why it is condemned by feminists as rape apologism – is that 
it suggests that the moral responsibility for minimising rape lies with girls and 
women. It moreover obscures the fact that this advice is good advice only because 
men do in fact rape; the ubiquity of rape is treated as a fixed fact, rather than a 
contingency for which men bear moral responsibility. Similarly, the 
counterproductivity critique treats the counterproductivity of anger as a fixed fact, 
rather than as a largely contingent feature of social reality.39 The advice to abstain 
from drinking or not to get angry can sometimes be sincerely defended as 
‘encouraging people to focus on what they have control over’, as a merely pragmatic 
or prudential counsel. But that defence fails to understand how the insistence on 
people’s pragmatic interests – not to be raped, or not to be dismissed from the public 
sphere – can itself be oppressive, an obfuscation of the fundamental injustice at work. 
Indeed it is this strategy of obfuscation that Buckley (one imagines inadvertently) 
betrays in his debate with Baldwin, when he reveals that the counterproductivity of 
black anger is caused not by some fixed political fact but by the wilful violence of 
white Americans. 
 
And yet, there is also something morally troubling about the opposing rallying cry: 
‘nurse your anger!’ In this we hear a lack of care for the suffering agent herself; we 
might detect a threat that she will be instrumentalised for a political cause. Neither 
of these slogans is morally right on its own, and yet both contain some truth. We 
want to say both at once, and yet that will be to offer practically incoherent advice. 
As experienced by the sympathetic bystander, this second-personal conflict does not 
carry with it the psychic sting of the first-personal conflict. But imagine its subject 
to be the parent of a child who is facing an occasion for apt counterproductive anger 
– say the parent of a young black girl who is regularly sexually harassed at school.40 
How does the parent advise his or her child? Here the conflict is raised acutely, with 
all the sting (perhaps more) of the first-personal conflict. 
 
I have suggested that occasions for apt counterproductive anger present victims of 
injustice (and sometimes those who care for those victims) with substantive and 
psychically costly normative conflicts. I want to draw out two lessons from this. 
First, those who argue that one ought not get angry whenever it would be 
counterproductive to do so face an argumentative burden. They must explain why it 
is that in cases where one’s anger would be counterproductive yet apt, prudential 
                                                 
39 To the extent that anger’s counterproductivity is determined by anger’s deleterious effects on 
epistemic rationality, then the counterproductivity of anger does indeed seem to be (given the laws of 
human psychology) fixed. But I take it that a large part of what makes anger counterproductive 
(when it is counterproductive) are the contingent ways that we respond to the anger of oppressed 
people. 
40 For a detailed discussion of the disproportionate amount of sexual harassment (and gendered 
violence more generally) that targets black girls in American schools, see Tonnesen 2013. 
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considerations must overwhelm aptness considerations.41 It is not at all obvious, in 
these kinds of cases, that the normative demands to better one’s unjust situation beat 
out the normative demands to appreciate the badness of one’s situation. We are 
owed an account of why, in such cases, prudential considerations trump all else – and 
specifically trump what I have argued is the intrinsic value of apt anger. Until we are 
given such an account, we are right to be suspicious that the counterproductivity 
critique – as in the case of Buckley’s response to Baldwin – is often an attempt at 
social control masquerading as concern. 
 
The second lesson is this. During a radio interview in 1961, Baldwin was asked 
about comments he had made in a review of the poems of Langston Hughes. He said: 
 
[T]o be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious is to be 
in a rage almost all the time…[T]he first problem is how to control 
that rage so that it won’t destroy you…You have to decide that you 
can’t spend the rest of your life cursing out everybody that gets in your 
way. As a writer, you have to decide that what is really important is not 
that the people you write about are Negroes, but that they are people, 
and that the suffering of any person is really universal. If you can reach 
this level, if you can create a person and make other people feel what 
this person feels, then it seems to me that you’ve gone much further, not 
only artistically, but socially…I talked about Langston not being the 
first poet to find these responsibilities all but irreconcilable. And he 
won’t be the last, because it demands a great deal of stepping out of a 
social situation in order to deal with42 
 
Baldwin thought that both he and Hughes best served the world ‘not only 
artistically, but socially’ through the sort of writing that transcended raw anger and 
achieved a hard-won universality. Not only art but justice demanded that Baldwin 
and Hughes set aside their justified daily rage. In this way Baldwin accepted the 
empirical presupposition at the heart of Buckley’s counterproductivity critique – that 
black anger didn’t best serve the interests of black people. But unlike Buckley, 
Baldwin knew all too well that this generated a profound conflict. Indeed Baldwin 
here is speaking, I want to suggest, of two kinds of injustice. First is the daily 
oppression of being a black person in the US – impoverishment, ghettoisation, threat 
of physical attack, political and social marginalisation, psychic degradation. And 
second is what I want to call affective injustice: the injustice of having to negotiate 
between one’s apt emotional response to the injustice of one’s situation and one’s 
desire to better one’s situation – a conflict of responsibilities that are ‘all but 
                                                 
41 There is a straightforward case to be made from the perspective of the counterproductivity critic if 
getting aptly but counterproductively anger would violate a categorical moral duty either to oneself 
or another. But if there are simply moral and prudential reasons not to get angry, and ‘aptness’ 
reasons to get angry, I take it that this burden must still be met. 
42 Baldwin et al 1961/1962, p. 81. 
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irreconcilable’.43,44 Affective injustice, I take Baldwin to be suggesting, partly 
constitutes the injustice of the black situation. 
 
Affective injustice is a second-order injustice that is parasitic on first-order injustice, 
a sort of psychic tax that is often levied on victims of oppression. But it is not only a 
psychic tax. Like more familiar kinds of injustice, the wrongness of affective injustice 
does not lie primarily in the fact that it makes its victims feel bad; its wrongness lies 
rather in the fact that it forces people, through no fault of their own, into profoundly 
difficult normative conflicts – an invidious choice between self-preservation and 
justified rage.45 Insofar as we have basic human entitlements to both self-
preservation and full emotional lives – lives that allow us to exercise our capacity to 
aptly respond to the world – affective injustice represents a violation of our basic 
humanity. Of course, first-order injustice need not be accompanied by affective 
injustice. It’s possible that getting aptly angry about some first-order injustice 
would actually improve one’s situation. But that’s likelier to be true for someone 
whose anger isn’t generally seen as sufficient reason to dismiss her from the public 
sphere – likelier, that is, for the sort of person who isn’t already stereotyped as 
rageful, violent or shrill. If this is right – if affective injustice is a genuine 
phenomenon, one that disproportionately affects those who are already 
disproportionately affected by more familiar forms of injustice – then our political 
arrangements are festering with much unrecognised injustice. Things are even 
worse than we generally take them to be. This is the ugly truth that those who 
would dismiss anger on the grounds of its counterproductivity obscure,  
inadvertently or purposefully. 
 
In the final section of this paper, §5, I discuss the prospects for alleviating affective 
injustice by dissolving the false but widely held opposition between anger and 
                                                 
43 In the kind of cases I am primarily interested in, anger is counterproductive because of contingent, 
unjust social arrangements – namely, because the anger of victims of systematic injustice is treated as 
sufficient reason to further ignore, marginalise or oppress them. But of course anger might be 
counterproductive not because of any underlying injustice; for example, it might be 
counterproductive for a victim of racism to get angry because doing so would make his blood 
pressure rise dangerously. I am inclined to count the latter sort of case as also a case of affective 
injustice: not only is he a victim of racism, he must also face an invidious choice between getting 
justifiably angry and keeping himself alive. That said, I am open to the thought that the category of 
affective injustice should be narrowed, such that affective injustice only arises when one’s apt 
emotional response to injustice would be counterproductive as a result of an underlying injustice in 
how one’s emotional responses are treated – most obviously, through negative prejudicial 
stereotypes. 
44 I mean affective injustice to be a genus of which occasions for apt counterproductive anger 
represent one species. One could also suffer affective injustice by being presented with an occasion for 
apt but counterproductive sadness, hopelessness, despair, etc. (perhaps where the counterproductivity 
of those affective attitudes is the product of an underlying injustice; see fn. 43). The notion of affective 
injustice bears many similarities to Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), the 
injustice that occurs when one is epistemically harmed (e.g. by being deprived of hermeneutical 
resources for understanding one’s oppressed position, or being treated as an unreliable testifier) as a 
result of underlying social injustices (i.e. negative prejudicial stereotypes). 
45 I don’t wish to take a view on whether such conflicts rise to the level of normative dilemmas, where 
an agent is forced to do something she categorically ought not do. 
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reason. But first I turn, in the next section, to an objection to my argument so far: 
namely, that my argument has conflated anger as such with its stereotypical 
expressions. 
 
4. Refining the counterproductivity critique 
 
I have argued that occasions for apt but counterproductive anger present victims of 
injustice with substantive normative conflicts, conflicts that themselves plausibly 
constitute a form of second-order injustice. This puts pressure on the 
counterproductivity critic to explain just why we should accept his inference from 
the counterproductivity of one’s anger to an all-things-considered prohibition on 
one’s getting anger. One can imagine the counterproductivity critic responding as 
follows: ‘My target isn’t anger as such, but common expressions of anger, like 
shouting, hyperbolic rhetoric or aggressive facial expressions. When I say that one 
ought not get angry even when encountering injustice, what I really mean is: one 
ought not act angry in politics. One’s being angry isn’t counterproductive; only one’s 
acting angry is. For all I’ve said, being angry might be perfectly permissible on some 
occasions, precisely because (as you say) it is sometimes apt. Thus I don’t face the 
explanatory burden with which you charge me.’ 
 
Many counterproductivity critics wouldn’t be willing to endorse this line of 
response. In particular, the Stoics and their contemporary followers like Nussbaum 
draw a strong, constitutive connection between anger and its stereotypical 
expression. But are they right to do so? On what we might call a pure disjunctivist 
view of anger, there is no significant connection between anger and its expression; 
anger is a mere feeling, and that feeling must be sharply distinguished from 
whatever behaviour contingently accompanies it. If the pure disjunctivist view is 
right, then the refined version of the counterproductivity critique must be taken 
very seriously indeed. For it will be perfectly coherent to say that victims of injustice 
ought not behave in stereotypically angry ways, but that they are permitted – indeed 
perhaps even encouraged or required – to feel angry. The Stoics then will be wrong 
to chastise anger as such; their proper target will turn out to be stereotypical but 
non-constitutive behavioural expressions of anger. Moreover, if the pure 
disjunctivist view is right, then the conflict I want to discuss – the conflict between 
instrumental and intrinsic reasons for getting angry – will turn out to be a chimera. 
For it will turn out that I have conflated reasons for being angry with reasons for 
acting angrily. 
 
We should, however, reject pure disjunctivism about anger. Empirical psychologists 
typically endorse what we might call strong functionalism about anger, the view that 
anger – as well as the other (putatively) basic, universal emotions of happiness, 
sadness, fear, surprise, disgust – is at least partly constituted by its stereotypical 
expression. This is because anger, along with the other basic emotions, appear to 
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possess manifestation and recognition conditions that are stable across human 
cultures, and that are shared in common with many mammals – e.g. grimacing, 
raised voice, aggressive staring.46 On the standard view within empirical 
psychology, basic emotions like anger are ‘affect programmes’, universal modes of 
complex, unconscious behaviour that have deep evolutionary roots. Such apparent 
universality constitutes strong reason to think that anger’s stereotypical expression 
is at least partly constitutive of anger, and thus that pure disjunctivism ought to be 
rejected. 
 
But if we reject pure disjunctivism, what are we to make of cases in which people 
seem to get angry without exhibiting stereotypical angry behaviour? Must we 
conclude that those who are culturally trained not to display patterns of angry 
arousal are incapable of getting angry?47 Or, to take a more specific case, must we 
accept that Gandhi’s spiritual exercises left him devoid of anger, rather than 
radically re-shaping the behavioural manifestations of his anger?48 Strong 
functionalism will require us to accept both these conclusions. I take this to be a 
counterintuitive cost. Where does this leave us? I want to suggest that a more 
moderate functionalism allows us to reject pure disjunctivism while leaving room for 
the possibility that anger’s natural expression can be altered significantly by cultural 
training. According to the sort of moderate functionalism I have in mind, the 
behavioural expressions that partly constitute a given individual’s anger depends on 
that individual’s cultural training. Some forms of cultural training leave the natural 
affect programme behaviours associated with a basic emotion more or less 
untouched. Other forms of cultural training (or spiritual re-training) might suppress 
these behaviours to the extent that what it is for the enculturated individual to be 
angry itself changes. For someone raised in a culture that teaches children never to 
raise their voices or grimace when angry, it is possible to be angry without 
exhibiting those behaviours. But for someone not raised in such a culture, raising 
one’s voice and grimacing in part constitutes one’s getting angry. To tell the latter 
sort of person that she is allowed to ‘feel angry’ but just isn’t allowed to raise her 
voice or grimace is like saying that one can take a pound of flesh but no jot of blood. 
It might be metaphysically possible for someone to do so, but it isn’t possible for the 
person in question to do so. It is of course metaphysically possible for the person in 
question to become the sort of person who can do so – precisely by engaging in 
radical affective retraining. But the proponent of the refined counterproductivity 
critique claims to be saying that the angry person is permitted to feel angry (here, 
now), not that the angry person is permitted to feel angry once she undergoes 
affective retraining. 
                                                 
46 Ekman 1972, 1989; DeLancey 2001; Griffiths 1997; cf. Darwin 1896. 
47 On cultural variation in emotions and their expression, see e.g. Markus and Kitayama 1991; Butler 
et al 2007; Friedlmeier et al 2011. 
48 On the complexities of Gandhi’s moral and political psychology – and for a case that Gandhi was 
driven by a radical intensity that is often overlooked – Faisal Devji’s The Impossible Indian: Gandhi and 
the Temptation of Violence (Devji 2012) cannot be too highly recommended. 
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Take an analogy. Suppose your natural singing voice is a soprano, and you’ve had no 
vocal training to allow you to sing in any other way. Someone tells you that you 
must not sing in a soprano voice. You protest that you’ve just been prohibited from 
singing. Your interlocutor balks at this suggestion, explaining that you are of course 
permitted to sing, just not to sing in a soprano voice. There is something at best 
confused and at worst disingenuous about this response. Singing in a soprano voice 
is the way you sing. It’s true that with intense vocal training you might be able to 
sing in a different range. But that doesn’t speak in favour of your interlocutor. For 
she is claiming not to have prohibited you from singing (here, now), whereas (at 
best) she is not prohibiting you from singing once you have undergone intensive 
vocal training. Similarly, the proponent of the refined counterproductivity critique 
cannot fairly claim that he permits the victim of injustice to feel angry (here, now). 
At best he permits the victim of injustice to feel angry once she has radically 
reconfigured what it is for her to get angry. 
 
One might worry that this line of defence won’t work to justify the use of angry 
political rhetoric employed by Baldwin or Malcolm X – the kind of angry expression 
that is often subject to the counterproductivity critique.49 For honed, stinging 
rhetoric might not seem to be part of what it is for anyone, constitutively speaking, 
to get angry. But is that right? For figures like Baldwin and Malcolm X, but also 
Catharine MacKinnon and Angela Davis, getting angry just does seem to involve an 
enviably articulate verbal expression, a swift and often automatic conversion of 
sentiment into word. Indeed one might worry that the counterproductivity critic, in 
seeking to distinguish anger from its rhetorically sophisticated expression, risks 
mischaracterising figures like Baldwin, Malcolm X, MacKinnon and Davis as simply 
shrewd political agents, rather than genuine victims of the oppression they argue 
against.50 Of course that such anger might be apt does not automatically yield the 
conclusion that the use of angry political rhetoric is always all-things-considered 
justified. But it does mean that when evaluating angry political rhetoric as a political 
strategy, it is not enough to think of it only in terms of its political efficacy. We must 
also think of it as an act in itself, an act that – when apt – registers and 
communicates the badness of injustice.51 
 
In brief: the refined counterproductivity critique requires us to endorse pure 
disjunctivism about anger, which we ought to reject on independent, largely 
                                                 
49 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this. 
50 In the Cambridge Union debate, Buckley says of Baldwin that his ‘charges against America are not 
so much that our civilisation has failed him and his people’, citing the fact that Baldwin, despite 
‘threaten[ing] America with the necessity for us to jettison our entire civilization’ is ‘treated from 
coast to coast of the United States with a kind of unctuous servitude which goes beyond anything 
that was ever expected from the most servile of Negro creatures by a southern family’. Buckley also, 
bizarrely, says that in writing The Fire Next Time Baldwin ‘didn’t…speak with the British accent that 
he used exclusively tonight’. The implication – that Baldwin is opportunistically feigning emotional 
identification with the plight of his fellow black Americans – is clear (and clearly false). 
51 Thanks to Sophie Smith for discussion of this issue. 
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empirical grounds. But rejecting pure disjunctivism doesn’t require us to accept a 
strong functionalism that precludes the possibility of significant variation in anger’s 
expression; instead we should embrace a moderate functionalism according to which 
the constitutive connections between anger and behaviour can rest on particulars of 
cultural training, and indeed the particulars of individual personality. Once we 
endorse such a moderate functionalism, the refined counterproductivity critique 
loses its bite. We cannot distinguish sharply enough between anger and angry 
behaviour to vindicate the critic’s claim only to be condemning the latter. 
 
Before I proceed to the next (and final) section, a brief note on violence. In speaking 
about anger’s stereotypical expressions I’ve deliberately not discussed violence. 
Though of course associated with anger, violence isn’t thought to be part of anger’s 
‘affect program’; indeed, from an evolutionary perspective the function of anger is to 
avoid costly violent interactions while securing the goods that might be afforded by 
such interactions. And in general most adult humans are capable of getting angry 
without becoming physically violent. (Consider how many supposedly ‘violent’ 
protests involve only physical damage to property, not other persons.) Yet I grant 
that some people might be such that for them getting angry just is (in part) getting 
violent. If so, then telling such people not to be violently angry is equivalent to 
telling them not to (here, now) be angry. I think we can and should accept this 
implication. If someone has been raised such that she cannot get angry without 
getting violent, then when we tell her that she cannot be violent we are also saying 
that she cannot get angry – at least not without radical affective retraining. But such 
a case is importantly different from the cases I’ve been examining. In the standard 
‘counterproductivity’ case, anger is said to be all-things-considered prohibited 
because of its bad consequences. But when violence is wrong, it’s presumably wrong 
not because of its bad consequences, but rather because it is categorically wrong, a 
violation of a moral prohibition against needless physical harm. So when an instance 
of anger constitutively involves violence, such anger would be all-things-considered 
prohibited not because of its bad consequences, but rather because it involves a 
violation of a basic moral prohibition. Thus a defence of the possibility of anger’s 
aptness need not yield a defence of angry violence. 
 
5. Alleviating affective injustice 
 
The focus of this paper has been a type of conflict frequently faced by victims of 
injustice, conflicts that I’ve argued can themselves constitute a distinctive form of 
injustice. What should we do when faced with such conflicts? There is a standard 
philosophical way of hearing that question, and a standard philosophical way of 
answering it. We hear it as a question about what, in general, agents facing these 
conflicts ought to do, and we answer it by saying: these agents ought to do what 
they have all things considered reason to do, or what they practically ought to do, 
and so on. There are of course philosophers who resist the idea that there is a fact of 
 19 
the matter about what we have ‘all things considered reason’ to do, or that there is 
some normatively supreme ‘practical’ ought that resolves such conflicts. This 
resistance is often motivated by phenomenological considerations: these conflicts 
just feel too hard, too irresolvable, for there to be such an easy way through. Indeed, 
talk of what we have ‘all things considered reason to do’ risks making the choice 
between apt anger and self-preservation sound no more fraught than the choice 
between going to the theatre or to the cinema; some might think it sits badly with 
Baldwin’s observation that such conflicts involve responsibilities that are ‘all but 
irreconcilable’. I don’t wish to take a stand on this question. Either way, we are left 
wanting to know what those who actually face such situations ought to do. This is 
the pressing political question. Heard as a request for political guidance, and not just 
a theoretical question about the metaphysics of normativity, it is hard to know how 
to respond – except to say that agents should be guided by both a concern for 
appreciating the world as it is, and making the world as it ought to be. But that is 
merely a pleasant way of re-describing a vexing problem. 
 
Let me suggest a different way of thinking about what we might do about such 
conflicts. The conflicts I’ve described are of the kind that particularly interested 
Hegel – that is, conflicts that are the result of our contingent social and political 
arrangements. For Hegel, the political utility of tragic spectatorship lies in tragedy’s 
ability to dramatise the conflicts to which such contingencies give rise; the canonical 
case is that of Antigone’s conflict between her filial and civic duties. Tragedy calls on 
us to achieve reconciliation: the re-arrangement of our political circumstances so 
that such conflicts no longer arise, or at least do not arise so often. In a Hegelian 
spirit, we can ask: what would need to change for there no longer to be occasions for 
apt counterproductive anger? Given what I’ve said about the relationship between 
such occasions and first-order injustice, two options present themselves. First, we 
could make it the case that there were no longer any occasions for apt anger – in 
other words, that there were no injustices. Such a moral utopia would certainly offer 
a resolution to affective injustice, but it’s not a resolution that offers much hope in 
the actual context of non-ideal politics. Alternatively, we could push the other lever 
at hand: not anger’s aptness, but anger’s counterproductivity. What would it take, then, 
to lessen the counterproductivity of anger? 
 
Seneca wrote that anger is ‘closed to reason’, that the mind ‘if it plunges into 
anger…has no power to check its impetus; its very weight and the downward 
tendency of vice needs must hurry it on, and drive it to the bottom’.52 Rationality 
counsels against anger; anger corrupts rationality. Anger is presumed to be the 
enemy of reason, and the angry person presumed not to be a fit member of the 
rational political community. Insofar as we cleave to the liberal aspiration for a 
rational politics, it seems that anger has no place in the political sphere. An angry 
person then is not suitable for political community; she must be excluded until she 
                                                 
52 Seneca 1928, III.1. 
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has returned to her senses. Little wonder then that defenders of anger tend to be 
suspicious of the liberal enchantment with the idea of a rational politics. A rational 
politics has no room for anger, and so no room for one of the few weapons available 
to the oppressed. Thus the invocation of ‘rationality’ (like the invocation of ‘civility’) 
becomes an invocation of the status quo. 
 
Insofar as a rational politics has no place for anger, I am tempted to think: so much 
the worse for rational politics. But we should query the premise. If anger is 
rationally evaluable – if it is something we do for reasons, good and bad – then it has 
at least a prima facie place in a rational politics. Opponents of anger, like the Stoics or 
Pettigrove, might respond that even if anger is sometimes in this sense rational, its 
downstream effects on epistemic rationality are so grave that it should be, in the 
final analysis, excluded from politics.53 But this is an open, largely empirical 
question. As I have already mentioned, many philosophers argue that anger can be a 
source of moral and political knowledge; by reflecting on our anger, and the 
reactions of the powerful to our anger, we can come to know something about the 
existence and structure of previously unrecognised injustice. So while anger might 
have ill effects on our rationality, it can also have positive epistemic effects, and the 
ill must be weighed against the good. Moreover, if apt anger is itself a cognitive 
good, like true belief or knowledge – not a mere feeling, but (when apt) an 
appreciation of the facts – then, whatever its negative effects on rationality, its own 
intrinsic value must be totted up against them.54 It also remains an open normative 
question whether we are ever obligated to sacrifice one cognitive good in the 
interest of acquiring others: whether we are obligated, for example, to sacrifice an 
instance of apt anger for an increased ability to evaluate the evidence neutrally. For 
it is not at all clear that we are obligated to maximise the value of our total cognitive 
economies.55 Like the claim that the one should always be sacrificed for the many, 
epistemic consequentialism has a whiff of repugnance about it, a seeming failure to 
register the intrinsic, non-fungible value of some goods. It is not implausible to 
think that apt anger is such a good: that it is an intrinsically worthwhile thing not 
only to know but also to feel the ugly facts that structure our political reality. A 
rational politics, then, is not a politics without anger, and anger is not sufficient 
grounds for dismissing someone from the public sphere.  
 
I said above that it’s not particularly helpful to say that we can alleviate affective 
injustice by removing first-order injustices. But perhaps it’s not much less naïve to 
                                                 
53 Pettigrove describes several psychological studies that suggest ‘that ‘moral’ anger can have an 
adverse effect on an agent’s judgment across a wide range of morally relevant domains. Not only is 
the person who is angry about something at work more likely to come home and kick the cat, but, 
these studies suggest, he or she is more likely to believe the cat deserves it. So even if ‘moral’ anger 
has the epistemic merits that advocates have claimed on its behalf, these are accompanied by enough 
epistemic liabilities to temper whatever enthusiasm we might have felt for it’ (Pettigrove 2012, p. 
364). 
54 In this anger need not be different than other cognitive goods, like belief. 
55 For discussions of maximising and consequentialist views of the cognitive sphere, see Berker 2013a 
and 2013b. 
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suggest, as I just have, that we should make anger less counterproductive by 
dissolving the false dichotomy between anger and reason. Presumably this 
dichotomy is sustained not because of a philosophical mistake, but because it is useful 
for the preservation of the status quo; since it is oppressed people who have greatest 
reason to be angry, excluding anger from the public sphere is an efficient 
rationalisation for excluding those who most threaten the reigning social order. 
There is a philosophical mistake here (or so I think), one that philosophers have no 
doubt helped to keep in place, and that perhaps philosophers can help to remedy. But 
the real mistake is an ethical one – except that ‘mistake’ makes it sound non-
purposive, a mere accident or error. What I really mean to say is that we think and 
talk about political anger in the way we do because it serves those whom anger most 
stands to threaten, and that this is no mistake at all. 
 
‘Rage’ (μῆνιν) is the first word of Western literature, and in the Western tradition, it 
is the spectre of the raging Achilles that has haunted the debate about anger’s 
normative status. The Aristotelian defenders of anger thought that a man who failed 
to get angry at slights was slavish; such a man would never be an adequate fighter, 
for anger is, in Cicero’s ironic phrase the ‘whetstone of courage’.56 If there were no 
anger, there would be no Achilles: no men to risk their lives, defend honour and 
punish wrongdoing. The Stoics, anticipating a modern settlement in which 
legitimate violence is consolidated in the hands of the state rather than the hands of 
individual men, saw anger as destabilising and destructive. What was needed was 
reason without affect; the Stoical ideal was not a vengeful Achilles, but a cool-headed 
judge. But for the Aristotelians and Stoics alike, the question ‘ought one ever get 
angry?’ was implicitly understood to be about the powerful: free, wealthy men, with 
the capacity for unchecked violence. The question was whether such men should 
make themselves into a new kind of man, with the power of a civic ruler rather than 
a tribal warrior, but powerful nonetheless. It was simply taken for granted that 
women and slaves had no business getting angry; the debate about anger was never 
about them. Christianity told the same men that they should be neither judge nor 
warrior, but instead forgiving and meek. Here women and slaves might have been 
the model, but they were only models; it was through a free choice to wilfully 
transfigure oneself into a submissive lamb that Christianity offered its deepest 
power. 
 
A recognition of anger’s aptness might seem to threaten a return to the petulant and 
vengeful Achilles, a backwards slide into a form of life in which justice is not the 
business of the state, but the personal lot of each man. We tell ourselves that we 
have set anger aside, that we no longer have any need of it. Invoking the spectre of 
the raging Achilles, we condemn anger. But in so doing we neglect, as we have 
always neglected, those who were never allowed to be angry, the slaves and women 
who have the power of neither the state nor the sword. 
                                                 
56 Cicero 2002 4.43. 
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